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CROSS-SECTiONAL PATTERNS
Another perspective on the compensation package can be obtained
by looking beyond the collective experience outlined above and focus-
ing on the relationships anong the executives who comprise the sample.
Have the salary differentials between the top five executive positions
narrowed or widened over the years? What about total compensation
differentials? Do deferred and contingent rewards become more or less
important the farther down in the corporate hierarchy we go? Is the
pay package more volatile at higher levels? The answers to theseand
other questions require a cross-sectional analysis which the preceding
chapters do not provide. While such an analysis must still be confined
to the small group of senior officers for whom proxy statement com-
pensation information is available, certain trends observed within that
group can perhaps be extrapolated to lower managementlevels as well.
Before-Tax Salaries and Bonuses
Separate before-tax salary and bonus time series for the individuals who
received the five largest amounts of such payments in each firm in each
year from 1940 to 1963 are recorded in Table17 and Chart 18. The
numbers contained therein represent averages across the sample com-
panies throughout. Table 18 and Chart 19 restate the series in ratio
form, using the highest current remuneration payment in every year
as a base. Thus, in 1940, the executives withthe second largest amounts
of salary and bonus in each company received, on average,61 per cent
as much as did the top executives in the samefirms in that year. The
third-highest-salaried men received 51 per ceiit as much, and so ondown
the line.










salary and bonusdifferentials between theseveral executive positions
become successivel'greater the higher the level ofcompensation con-
sidered. This relationshipholds in virtuallyevery year studied. (lie on!
exceptions being thewar years 1942, 1943, and 1944,when the gap
betweenthefourth- andfifth-ranking executiveswas, on average,
slightly greater thanthat between the thirdand fourth. By far the most
194() l37.233 83.366 69.603 60.822
1941 145.281 89.678 7 1.570 64,059 56.073 I942 45.473 91.243 73.944 66,958
56.508
1943 144.208 93.952 75.929 66,61) 57 (173

























1949 169.703 116.943 91.5 54 84 .828 79,1)79
1950 178.452 127.835 I 00.47: 90.560 83.702
1951 183,235 35,817 106.432 98.044 89.79: 1952 185.330 137,619 113.319 100.805 92.04! 1953 193,556 145.816 119.312 107,386 l0l,223
1954 197,726 149.805 123.476 109.588 103,170
1955 205.656 157.171 I 30.730 117.067 107 .543 1956 215,767 162,774 136.632 120,898 115,417
1957 207.586 159.765 132.4 15 117.402 112.075 1958 207.101 151.223 126.566 112,099 105.983 1959 203.708 155.487 133.003 117.075 110,807

















109.89))striking salary increment in every instanceisthat between the top
executive and the second-ranking man. In fact, this increment alone is
iarger in all cases than the total salary differential separating the other
four men in the sample.
The second phenomenon which appears, however, is a steady narrow-
ing of this gap over time, at least in percentage terms. In the early 1940's
the annual salary and bonus awards associated with the first two exccii-
tivc positions in each firm differed by a little more than $50,000 on
averageor by between 35 and 40 per cent of the top executive's pay.
During the last nine years of the study. when a plateau of sorts was
reached, the $50,000 differential was still pretty much intact, but it
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940 61 5! 44 40
(94! 62 49 44 39
942 63 5! 46 39
1943 65 53 46 40
(944 64 5! 46 40
1945 64 52 46 42
(946 69 57 4 46
1947 68 55 49 44
(948 68 54 49 47
(949 69 54 47
1950 72 56 Si 47
1951 74 58 54 49
1952 74 61 54 50
(953 75 62 55 52
1954 76 62 55 52
(955 76 64 57 52
1956 75 63 56 53
1957 77 64 57 54
(958 73 61 54 51
(959 76 65 57 54
(960 75 65 57 SI
1961 73 64 57 53
(962 76 67 57
(963 76 67 58 52CROSS-SECTIONAL PATTERNS
CHART 19
Before-Ta.v .Salories and Bonuses in Relation to 'Top
Executive's, 1940-63
constituted then only a 25 per cent increment in total current renninera-
tion between the two positions. Thus, the men at both levels have en-
joyed just about the same absolute dollar increase in annual salary and
bonus since the early 1940's.
A similar development is reflected in the other three time series.Each
of the lower-ranking executive positions gained relative to the highest-
paid one. Moreover, they did so in such a manner as to maintain almost
exactly the percentage differences among themselves. Whenthe ex-
perience of the prewar years 1940 and 1941 is compared withthat of
the period 1955 through 1963, the average annual salary-plus-bonusofr
I
the top five executive positions in each companyexprcsse(l asaper
cent(Itthe renoerati(n of the highet-paid etliceri1ppcaafollos.
In effect, the whole pay schedule has shiftedupward in relationto the
tOj) executive's currcnt rewards. This pattern showsUJ) CVen niore clearly
when the rates of growth over time in the indicatedpayments are com-
puted. The implied compound annualrates between the terminalyears
1940 and 1963 are:
Essentially the samecomparison would be obtained byconsidering any
interval within this period.
After-Tax Salaries and Bonuses
As would be cxpcced,the after-tax currentrenluncration time series
tell a similar andsomewhat stronger story, since theinfluence of a
progressive personal incometax schedule is added to narrowing before-
tax differentialsTables 19 and 20 andCharts 20 and 2 Ipresent the
after-tax data in bothabsolute and percentageterms, using the same
format as above.
Again, the largestincrement in averagesalary and bonus payments
Occurs between the firsttwo executive rankings. In thiscase, however.
that increment isconsiderably smaller than itsbefore-tax counterpart.
Rank 1940-41 I 955-63
1 10(1 I 0(1
2 62 75 13
3 50 64 14
4 44 57 13
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FABLE 19




First Second hird 1otrth Fitth
1940 77.143 53,521 45,766 41,159 37.627
1941 67.202 46.395 38,924 35.735 32,173
1942 52.014 38.431 33,423 31.178 27,811
1943 43,036 33,698 29,766 27.452 24,878
1944 42,959 33.465 29.190 27.388 25.210
1945 42,817 33.222 29,418 27,339 21,044
1946 51,591 40.539 35,557 32.312 30.828
1947 53,05() 41.255 35,865 33.389 30.886
1948 77,775 59.448 50.191 46.489 44,804
1949 80.269 61.643 51,535 4805 45.785
1950 83,007 65.356 55,072 50.717 47.674
1951 79.482 64.296 54.611 51,214 47.850
1952 75.445 61.167 53.499 49.090 45.752
1953 77,716 63,772 55.572 51,205 48.640
1954 83,604 69.175 60.557 55.162 52,569
1955 85,637 71,338 62.707 57.560 53.737
1956 88.177 73.094 64,277 58.583 56.089
1957 86,302 72,346 63,009 57.392 56.454
1958 86.152 69.967 61,680 56.591 54.976
1959 85.767 71.653 64.188 58.564 55.394
1960 84.99 I 70.685 63,003 57.806 52.846
1961 84.524 68.613 62,231 56.862 53 .798
1962 85.274 70.896 65.123 58,327 54.320
1963 87.503 73,419 66.643 57.122 55 .046194 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
1 ABI L2(1
After-Tax Salaries aui Ronuses in







1940 69 59 53 49
1941 69 58 53 48
1942 74 64 60 53
1943 78 69 64 58
1944 78 68 64 59
1945 78 69 64 61
1946 79 69 63 6()
1947 78 68 63
1948 76 65 60 58
1949 77 64 60 57
1950 79 66 61 57
1951 81 69 64 60
1952 81 71 65 61
1953 82 72 66 63
1954 83 72 66 63
1955 83 73 67 63
1956 83 73 66 64
1957 84 73 67 65
1958 81 72 66 64
1959 84 75 68 65
1960 83 74 68 62
1961 81 74 67 64
1962 83 76 68 64
1963 84 76 65 63CROSS-SECTIONAL PATTERNS
CHART 20
















40 45 50 55 60 63
YE1R
195
In relation to the top executive's rewards, the differential came to 31
per cent in the early 1940's and about 17 per cent from 1955 on. If
we compare on that basis the changes over time on the after-tax salary
and bonus profile across all five positions, the result (in per cent) is:
Rank 1940-41 1955-63 Gain
1 100 100-
2 69 83 14
3 59 74 15
4 53 67 14

































Thus, on average, the fourmen immediately below the top executive in
each company experienced substantiallymore rapid increases in take-
home pay than lie did. In fact, theabsolute asvell as the percentage
differences declined inevery instance (see Table 19). While all these
gains were larger than in the before-taxcase, the four men still just about
maintained their positions relativeto each other. The after-tax annual
rates of salary and bonus growth from 1940to 1963 are:CROSS-SECTIONAL PATTFRNS 197
Annual Growth Rate
Rank (percent)
None of these, of course, is very great, confirming the judgments made
in the last chapter.
Both the before- and after-tax current remuneration data therefore
lead to essentially the same conclusions: (I) Salary and bonus dif-
ferentials increase steadily and sharply as we examine successively
higher executive levels within the corporate hierarchy. (2) There is
an especially large differential between the first two positions. (3) The
latter gap has narrowed significantly in percentage terms over the last
quarter century. (4) The annual salaries and bonuses of the four men
just below the top executive have not changed appreciably in relation
to one another in that time.
Predictably, the second of these conclusions is somewhat weaker on
an after-tax basis and the third somewhat strongera consequence in
both cases of progressive personal income taxes.
The fact that the direct current remuneration of the top executive in
each firm has not risen as rapidly over time as that of his immediate
subordinates, of course, does not necessarily imply that by a more
comprehensive index of performance he has also lost ground to them.
It may well be that he has regularly enjoyed more in the way of other
rewards than they have and that a different story will emerge when the
rest of the compensation package is made a part of the historical com-
parisons.
Total After-Tax Compensation
Tables 21 and 22 and Charts 22 and 23 present time series from 1940
to 1963 for those executives who received, according to the valuation
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?\veiage 'ltaI ,ILei-1ax ('uiitpeiiatuoi.I 940-ô
(dollars)
Nwi': Stock option profits averaged.1955-63.
Year
I:xccutive Ranking
t'ottrth Fifth First Second third
1940 101,979 60.355 50,08() 45,262 41.02
1941 91.535 64,() 14 5 1.669 40,964 36,24s
1942 65.96() 47,778 40,461) 36278 3 1.400
1943 56.467 4 1.394 35,809 3 l.93() 28.964
1944 63.673 45.991 37.392 32.689 29.622
1945 61,632 44.624 37.001 32,942 30.446
1946 69.043 52.21() 42,818 39.201 36.! 20
1947 78.317 52.072 44.136 39.5(1(1 35.919
1948 99.756 72.274 60,239 53.740 51.210
1949 105.311 77.738 62,293 56.901 51.881
1950 122.79() 84,192 69.584 61,925 56.565
1951 109,341 83.806 72,920 64.304 56.209
1952 116.657 85.777 73,412 64.281 57.122
1953 131.782 93.651 78,843 66.98 3 59,644
1954 143.470 101,337 83,193 72,480 64,901
1955 214,711 142,318 114.199 93.925 77.955
1956 214.054 143,996 114,157 94,262 81.181
1957 218,872 143.992 118.499 93,073 82.821
1958 206,987 141.588 113.916 87,065 77.762
1959 210.581 138,979 124,813 92.399 79.539
1960 205.361 141,439 116.882 92.892 81.311
196! 208.352 149.837 112.862 91.533 83,115
962 212,958 137,538 120.568 98,234 81.964
1963 204.094 139,243 124,547 100.965 76.973
Average:
1955-63 210.663 142,103 117.827 93.816 80,29!CROSS-SECTIONAL PATTERNS 199
tABLE 22
TiI Aftet--TaxCompencal ion inRelation to
Fop Executive's ('ompensation, 1940-63
(per cent)




1940 59 49 44 4()
1941 70 56 45 40
1942 72 6! 55 48
1943 73 63 57 5!
1944 72 59 51 47
1945 72 60 53 49
1946 76 62 57 52
1947 67 56 50 46
1948 73 60 54 51
1949 74 59 54 49
1950 69 57 St) 46
1951 77 67 59 51
1952 74 63 55 49
1953 71 60 51 45
1954 71 58 5! 45
1955 66 s: 44 36
1956 67 53 44 38
1957 66 54 43 38
1958 68 55 42 38
1959 66 59 44 38
1960 69 57 45 40
1961 72 54 44 40
1962 65 57 46 39
1963 68 61 50 38
Average:
1955-63 67 56 45 38200 EXECUTIVE ('OM P E NSATION
CHART22












45 50 55 60 63
YEAR
5th
compensation in each of the samplecompanies in each year. Thecur-
rent income equivalents of the varioussupplements to salary and bonus
are included in these figures, and thenumbers recorded representmean
values for the entiresample. Stock option profitsrealized during the
period 1955 through 1963are spread evenly over that period both in
the tables and in thecharts in order to facilitateinterpretation of the
results.
The issue raised in thepreceding section can thereforebe resolved:
when the wholepay package is taken intoaccount, the highest-paid
executivedoesturn out to have done justabout asvell in terms ofrates of compensation gmwth as his colleagues. A comparison between
the experience of the last two pre-Worid War II years and the plateau
























a Based on a twenty-four-year interval, i.e.,asif the two averages calculated
applied to the terminal years 1940 and 1963.
As was suggested earlier, and as will be confirmed by the compensation
breakdown presented below, this result is not difficult to explain. De-
ferred and contingent rewards have been employed more extensively at
higher executive levels. In fact, the extent to which such arrangements
appear to have evened out the disparities in compensation growth rates
implied by the salary and bonus time series argues strongly for two
propositions: first, that corporations make a conscious effort to con-
sider the value of the entire pay package in planning their executives'
remuneration; and second, that as part of this effort, they recognize the
effect of personal income taxes very explicitly, since the total compensa-
tion data tabulated are in after-tax terms throughout. While neither of
these is a terribly surprising conclusion, both now have a documentation
that has heretofore been lacking.
It should be stressed, however, that it is necessary in this connection
to accept the techniques used here to construct "current income equiva-
lents" for supplements to salary and bonus as appropriateand also
to suppose that the corporations in the sample perceivethe value of
those supplements in much the same way. The former is perhaps easier
to justify than the latter. On the other hand, theindividuals who in
practice make the relevant appraisals are both intelligent and economi-








1940-41Total After-Tax Compensation in Relation to Top
Executives, 1940-63
EXECUTIVE
terms of averages across fifty firms andover a period of years. It is not
unreasonable, therefore, to expect that the informal,implicitor even
temporarily erroncouscompensation valuationprocedures actually em-
ployed by these firms will operate toproduce a consensus which ap-
proximates the "correct" one. The historicalevidence certainly points
in that direction-_and it offers clearsupport for the hypothesis that the
top executive compensation package iscomprehensively planned to
achieve a specified level of after-taxreward.
The other phenomenon whichemerges from the figures concerns the







pattern which the salary and bonus data exhibited again appears: each
successive step upward on the corporate ladder carries with it a pro-
gressively greater increment in total after-tax remuneration. The in-
crement between the top two POS1t1OflS continues to be by far the most
substantial, exceeding the next three combined. In this case, however,
the close similarity of the growth rates in the five compensation tinie





















Therefore, if only at the senior executive level, the totalcompensation
proiile in large manufacturing firms is, except for ascale factor, just
about the same now as it was prior to World War11.1
Composition of the Package
Separation of the pay package into its componentsfurther amplifies
these conclusions. Tables 23 through 27 depictthe make-up over time
of the total remuneration associated with thefive positions. Chart 24
summarizes that information in its most pertinentform: after-tax salary
and bonus as a per cent of all after-taxcompensation. The secular
trend noted in Chapter 8 toward a diminishingrole for direct current
retnuneration is, of course, still quite apparent.The more interesting
feature of the data at the moment, however,is the consistently increas-
ing importance of pensions, deferred pay,profit-sharing plans, and
stock options at successively highercompensation levels. That pattern
is followed in virtually every year studiedand is especially marked from
1955 on.
If we compare the decade of the 1940'swith the last nine years
1 The differentials between positions 2 and 3 and between3 and 4 have,
however, tended to become more alike over the years.
Ir//
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1940 76.547 (75) 25.29(25) !( (0) )0 l0I
4944 65.804 (72) 15.474 (28) 709(0) 8(()) 91
1942 49.627 (75) 16.06125( 272(0 (0)
943 42.52376) 13.675 (14) 26)on (4)5,47
4944 41 .795 (66) 21.61434) 264(0) 0) ((,63
194S 41,221 (67) 2(1,112 (33) 799lOt- Oi )14(2
1946 48.569 (70) 18.951 (28)l.23(2) 0) 69)).)')
4947 51.497 (66) 4.I5O (3)) 2.67(1(3) ((0 78.3I7
4948 75,201 (75) 2(4,883 (21) 2.829(3( 841(4)
1949 78,767 (75) 18.259 (17) 7.242(7) .043 I) ((IS3) I
1950 9.852 (65) 3)1.741 (25) 9.755(8) 2.442(1) 122.79))
1951 74,623 (68) 24.469 (234 2.238(24 8,0!))('7) 109,'t41 152 74.927 (62)22.459 ((9) 3,755(3)I8.!6 ((6) I 16f157
1953 73.100 t56) 25.644 (19) 6.976(5 26.063 t210 131.782
4954 78.353 (54)26.719 (49) 12.610 25.788 (1$)14)47))
1955 79,478 (37)46.822 (22) 13.513(6)74.646 (35) 24.4 11)
(956 8 1.347 05)38,385 (46) 19.425(8)96.5 17 (4)) 235.674
957 80,73636) 39,733 (17)23.508 (I)))83.257 07) 7.27'7
4958 8(1,985 (48) 31,618 (19)49.488 (II) 37.346 (22) 169,43)1 1959 82,467 (39)34,768 (IS)24.74910)75.365 (36) 711.4)49
196(1 80.299 (36)28.619 (II)21.546 (((091,247 t4I 211.711
1961 80,297 (39) 19.236(9) 33.97 I(17)70.89 (35) 04.174
1962 79.113 (35) 26,684 (13)37.365 (144 86.82839) 224.889
963 83,073 (44) 18,726 (4(4)27,399(IS)58.087 (3(1 87.279
Averages:
l940-49 57.52 (72) 20.443 (261 4.574(2) I (0 79.3(17 955-63 80.833 (38)34.288 (IS)13.645II) 74.897 (36)V car
Salary and
Ik)flUs
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1941) 52.715 (87) 7,61! (13) - (0) 29(0) 60,355
1941 46.069 172) 17,895 (28)- (0) 50(0 643)14
1942 39.191 (82) 8.587 (18)- 0)- (0) 47.778
1943 32,47378) 8.921 (22)- (0)- (0) 41.394
944 32.61)1 (71) I.39)) (79 (0) (0) 45.99!
945 33.341 (75) 1.247 (251 36(0)- (0) 44.624
946 41.213 (79) 9.72419 l.'77('I- (0) S' '10
(947 40.958 (79) 10.999 )71i 115(0)- (0) 52.072
1948 58.556 181) 12.553 (17) 1,146(2) 19(0) 72,274
1949 60,998 (79) 12.(8)) (16) 4,009(5) 52101 77.738
1950 65.179 (781 1S369 (18) 3.408(4) 237(0) 84.192
1951 64,968 (78) 14.523 (17) 2.242(3) 2.074(2) 83.806
1952 59.270 (6%) 13.636 (16) 5.93817) 6,933(8) 85.777
1953 63,4(13 (68) 14.982) 16) 4.442(5) 0.824 (II) 93.65)
1954 69.261 (68) 14.964 (IS) 7.106(7) 10,007 (tO) 101,337
1955 7 1.71)4 (53)25.320 1)9) 5.753(4)32.993 (24) 35.770
956 72.78$ (50)20.15$ (14)il.509(8)41.144 (28) 145.599
1957 71.808 (50) 20.663 (IS) 11,981(8)38,80)) (27) 143,251
958 69.91959) 20.558 (17) 11,57(1)1)))U.832 (14) 118.879
1959 67.813 (48) 17,554 (12) 14.071 (10)43.49) (30) 142.929
1961) 71.572 (481 16.003 (111 14323(9)48.683 (32) 150.581
1961 68.363 (45)16.383 (II)25.550 (17)40,157 (27) 5(1,453
1962 72.604 (16)17.252 (II) 8.14))(5)59.112 (38) 157,109
1963 72.509 (541 17.049 03) 10.144(7) 34.656 (26) 134.35$
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( )ption I Oil!
.16.299 (92 1,7 fS (0) U((1) 50.080
38,935 (75) 12.635 (1!5) (0) 98(0) 51.619
33.60183( 6.85917)- 0)
404(10
30.062 (84) 5.747(6) )()) (0) %5,:o9
29.50579) 7,88721) -- (0
29.229 (79) 7,738 (2! 33i0 -- 0) 37.0w
36.24585! 6.486 (IS) 8!(0) -- (Oj 42.88
35.874 (81) 7.822 (IS) 432i) 8(0) 44.136 I 51.961 (86) 8.336 (14) 253(0) 89(0) 60.'39
91.869 (83) 9,801 ((6) 572 I 52(0) 62.293
56.004 (80) 12.219I 8 1.041(2) 32!(0) 69,584 54.580 75) 14.941 (21) 1.604(2 I 1.795(2) 72.920
54,270 (74) 2,788 (17) 1,1)91(2) 5.263(7) 73.412 55.661 (7!) 14.378 (IS) 2.127 3 tM75(8) 78,843 61,179 (73) 10,615 (13) 5.464(7) 5.934(7) 83.193
63,116 (58) 19.5 16 (1$) 3.163(3)23.193 (2!) 108,988
65,479 (56) 14.74613) 5.528(5) 30.981 (26) 116.734
64.798 (SSt 16.740 114) 8.558)7t 28.267 (24) I 18.Th2
64.678 (64)14.209 ((4) 6.624(7 15.683 (IS) 01,11)5
68,140 (53)14.697 (II)13.572 (II) 32.850 (25) 29.299
66.987 (57) 12.483 (10) 9.008(8) 29.676 (2c( I 18.1S4
65.864 (57) 9,648(8) 8.946(8)31.928 (27) 116.386
68,273 52 11.989(9) 11.903(9) 38.330 (31)) 130,494
70,465 (58)13.476 (II) 12,20)) (10) 24.731 !2 I) 120.874
.38318 (83) 7.703 (17) 138Ot 32(0) 46.191
66.432 (56) 14.167 (12) 8.8345 28.404 (24) 117.827CROSS-SECTIONAL PATTERNS 207
tABlE 26
Flements of After-Tax Compensation. Fourth-RankingExecutive,
1940-63
(dollars)
Norr-.: Figures in parentheses denotepercentages of iota! eachear
1940 41,713(92) 3.465(8)-(0) 84(0) 45,262
I941 36,692 190) 4.174 (10)-(0) 98(0) 40.964
1942 31.620 (87) 4,619 (131-(0) 39(0) 36.278
1943 27.583 (86) 4.347 ((4)-(0)- (0) 31930
1944 27,502 (84) 5.187 (161-(0)- (0) 32.689
1945 27.699 (84) 5.203 (16) 40 101- (0) 32.942
1946 32.52 (83) 6.123 (16) 5(6 (I) (0) 39.20!
1947 33.653 (85) 5.673 114) 174 (I)- (0) 39,500
1948 47.33488) 6.009 (II) 290 (I) 107(0) 53.74()
1949 49.422 (87) 7.024 (12) 401 (Il 54(0) 56.901
1950 50.704 (82) 10.179 (17) 786 (I) 256(0) 61.925
1951 53,097 (83) 9.140 (14) 490 (I) 1.577(2) 64.304
1952 51.117 (80) 8.458 (13) 1.310 (2) .396(St 64.28!
1953 52.808 (79) 8.123 (12) 1.798 (3) 4.253(6) 66.983
1954 57.400 (79) 8.333 (12) 3,889 (51 2.8584i 72.480
1955 60,512 (67) 14.892 (17) 1,891 (2) 13.005 (14) 90.301
1956 61.902 (63) 12.525 (13) 3.204 (3) 20,858 (21) 98,491
1957 59,733 (64) 13.090 (14) 3.622 (4) 16.400 (18) 92,844
1958 58.281 (69) 9.886 (II) 2.268 (3) 14.304 (17) 84,740
1959 61,469 (65) 9.488 (10) 4.813 (5) 18.890 (20) 94,660
1960 57,939 (62) 10,596 (II) 7.728 (8) 17.794 (19) 94.057
1961 56.786 (58) 10.203 (II) 7.9)5 (8) 22.491 (23) 97.395
1962 58.544 (58) 14.419 (14) 8.642 (9) 18.497 (19) 100.102

















Salary and l'rofii- Stock
Year Bonus Pension Sharing Options -1 otalI












940 37.978 (93) 3.0-15(7)-0) -- (0) 41.023 1941 32.694 (90) 3.53010) (0) 2))(0)
1942 27,912 (89) 3.488 (II) (1) - (0) 31.4(10 1943 25.109 (87) 3.855 (13) (0) - 0) 28.9ô4 1944 25,54) (86) 4(18! (14i (0) -- (0) 29.622
1945 26.412 (87) 4.03.)I (01 (0) 0,446 1946 31.688 (88) 4.423 (12) 0 (0) ((0 36,121) 1947 32.272 (90) 3.63)) 00) 8 (0) 9
(948 45.529 (89) 5.605 (II) 58 0) 17(0) 51.210 1949 46.108 (89) 5.571) (II) 156 (0) 46(0) 51.881
1951) 49.589 (88) 6.343 (II) 379 (I) 2540)) 56,5,c 1951 48.262 (86) 6.646 (12) 439 (I) 862(I) 56.209 1952 47.330 (83) 6.789 (12) 202 (0) 2.802(5) 57.122 l95' 51.096 ($6) 6.831 (II) 323 (I) 1.394(2) 59,644 954 54,476 (84) 6.964 (II) 582 (I) 2.87941 64.90!
1955 55.48! (72) 9,822 (13) 8)6 (I) 10.411 (14) 76,53j (956 58.528 (66) 9.409 0)) 1.409 (2) 18.954 (21) 88.300 1957 60.075 (71) 8,8)0 (I))) 2.102 (3 13.903 (16) 84,889 195$ 55.025 (76) 8.547 (12) 2.355 (3) 6.496(9) 72.423 1959 55.032 (70) 9.408 1)2) 3.264 (4) 0.633 1)4) 78,fl7
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recorded, the breakdown of the total after-taxremuneration received in
each of those periods is as follows:
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Supplements to salary anti bonus thereforeturn out to he twiceas iim
poitant in recent years for the top'xecittive 1!I eachcompias for
the fifth-ranking man, andmore than twice as importantas for hisOwn pre- I 95() predecessors.
The same relationship can heseen to 1101(1 not on1' for theseveral deferred and contingentarrangements combined but for eachonin- dividuaflyWhile the volatility of stockoption profits pulls thecorn-
panisons somewhat out of line in certainyears, the result isunmistak able if the data arc averagedover any period of time: eachdevice be-
comes steadily more valuable in relationto total compensationat pro-
gressively higher executive positions.For the interval1 955 through
1963 the profile is: 2
As a Per Cent of All Compensa:
If the same itemsare expressed instead asa percentage of after-tax
salary and bonus, thepattern is even morePronounced:
Value as a Per Cent ofSalary and Bonus:
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The increasing emphasis on stock Options in particular has a very
powerful effect on the over-all results, since they were by far the most
izcab1c adjunct to current remuneration (luring this period. Indccd, they
were so profitable that "adjunct" s really too mild a description.
It is also worth noting that the value of an individual's prospective
pension benefits increases in importance as compared with his salary
and bonus at successively higher levels just as do the other arrangements
indicated. This is somewhat unexpected, because in most instances the
promised benefits are specified to be a direct function of salary by the
provisions of the corporation's retirement plan. The fact that the com-
parisons here are on an after-tax basis accounts for part of the observed
progression(i.e.,if pension benefits are proportional to before-tax
salary, they will rise steadily in relation to after-tax salary) but cer-
tainly not all of it. The rest is apparently a "real" phenomenon resulting
from differences in ages, years of employment, career salary patterns.
and other factors.
The most likely explanation for sucha consistent and unequivocal
trend in the composition of the pay package is. of course, a reaction by
firms to the heavy personal income tax burden on very large salary and
bonus payments. The availability of deferred and contingent compensa-
tion devices provides them with an obvious alternative whose attractive-
ness increases steadily the greater the aggregateremuneration to be
generated. The responses which the cross-section data identify arethere-
fore appropriate and predictable ones.
There may, however, be another consideration which hascontributed
to the popularity of these devices, especiallyin the case of the top
executives of business firms such as those examined hereandit is in
connection with the top executive that we observe mostclearly the role
of various supplements in making up for a lag inthe rate of growth of
direct cash payments. Given the SEC's proxy statementdisclosure rules,
a large corporation may findit more prudent from the standpoint of
shareholder or labor relations to reward itshighest-paid employee by
relying heavily on deferred and contingent arrangements.Even though
the salaries and bonuses of the firm's other seniorofficials are also pub-
lished each year, the largest figure reportedis likely to command the212 EXECUTI'E COM PINSAT ION
Variability of ('o?npensalwn
most public attention and he the focal point ol an' Criticism'thus the
hitorica1 patterns recorded above ITIaVpart he a rcticcti,it ofa Con-
Cern by corporations with the appearance as well ais the suhstaiceof
the conipensation bargain.
.A final aspect of the pay package which the time series abovehighlight
is the variability of aggregate after-tax rewards from year to\'car, The
fact that an increasing reliance on common stock-basedcoalpelisation
instruments has in recent years caused the value of ilfl execLitjye'Sre-
muneration to become more sensitive to market conditions andthereby
more volatile has been pointed otit on several occasions. Givennow a
total compensation profile across allfive top executive positions,itic
possible to examine the relationships among those positionsinthis
dimension as well.
For that purpose. the period from 1955 to1963again seems the
most appropriate on which to focus. The patterns observed inearlier
years reflect the influence both of growth trends in before-taxcompellsa
(ion and of several changes in tax rates. The resulting variabilityof
after-tax rewards at difterent executive levels in thoseyears is, accord-
ingly. only in small part a function ofconscious Compensation policy
differences, AfterI 955, however, personal tax rates dklnot \'ar', and
aggregate executive remuneration effectively reacheda plateau. At the
same time, those rewards which give rise tO most of the volatilityin
which we are interested finallycame into their own. The last nine years
of the study therefore provideas ''controlledan environment as we
are likely to find for any cross-sectional analysis.
The pattern that emerges from thedata for those yearsis sum-
marized in the tabulationon the following page. It turns out that, in
general, the higher an executive'stotal compensation, the itiore volatile
it is. both in absolute termsand in relation to average pa'. rhis pattern
is followed quite consistentlyas far down as the fourth-ranking execu-
tive position in eachcompany. but seems to falter thereafter. A more
extensive sample coveringa greater range of management levels would
A srnihtr point was made inChapici .CROSS-SECTIONAL PATTERNS 213
Computed in each in:stauce on the basis of the nine observed deviations
fromthe 1955-63 mean.
therefore be especially useful in this case. Because the importance of
ownership-orientcd rewards increases steadily at higher ranks, the vola-
tility of aggregate remuneration would normally be expected to dis-
play the same tendency. As things stand, however, it isimpossible to
tell whether the apparent departure from that expectation in thefifth-
ranking position is due to some special set of circumstances related to
the particular group of executives studied or is characteristicof an
actual levelling-off of the degree of compensationvariability at the point
indicated.
The extent as well as the pattern of such variabilityis worth em-
phasizing. Even during a period when over-all compensation rates
reached a plateau, the same executive position within thetypical large
manufacturing corporation was subject to anywhere from a16 to a 32
per cent variation in total after-taxremuneration from one year to the
next, depending on how well that corporation'sperformance was re-
ceived by the investing public. This finding suggests adegree of stock
market involvement by the executives affectedwhich should go a long
way toward encouraging anentrepreneurial attitude on their part. It is
also clear that the much-malignedstock option is primarily responsible
for this development. A comparison of thefluctuations in the annual
stock option "current income equivalents"observed since 1955 with the
measures of variability tabulatedabove for the whole compensation
package illustrates the latter point.
By groups other than executives,thatis.See,for example: The Stock
Option Scandal,Industrial Unionl)epartmeflt. A FLCIO. Washington.D.C.,
1959; Erwin N. Griswold, "Are Stock OptionsGetting Out of Hand?," Harvard
Business Review, November-December 1960, pp.49-55.
Total Alter-Tax Compensation: I 955-63 (dollars)Vtrihility
Indexes
Executive Standard
Rank Mcan(p) Range(R)Des'iation() " R/p /ii
21(1,663 66.238 19,793 0.314(1.094
2 142.103 38.230 10,648 0.27(10.075
3 117,827 29,299 8.556 (1.2490.073
4 93,816 15,362 4,408 0.1640.047
5 80,291 17,376 5,961 0.2160.074a 1)etermined according to the nine deviations from the 1955-63mean stock opuon current equivalent.
Stock options clearly exerted the major influence duringthis interval
In fact, the total after-tax compensation of theSecond-ranking execu-
tives would have been even more volati!e had other rewardshot operated
to dampen the fluctuations that resulted from changingoption profits.
Executive Ages
\Vhile the concern thus far has been with the sizeand form of the in-
conic enjoyed by executives, there are several othercharacteristics of
their employment circumstances whichnecessarily become apparent in
the course of generating dataon compensation. Two of theseare so
easily identified and tabulated, andare sufficiently interesting, thata
short digression seems in order.
Table 28 and Chart 25 indicate, forevery year from 1940 to 1963,
the average (mean)age of the individuals who occupied the five highest-
paid executive positionsinthe companies studied. Thefiguresin
parentheses in Table 28 denote thenumber of men actually represented
in the sample in eachyear at each of those five positions (see Ap-
pendix J).
The most striking feature ofthe resulting history is the fact thattop
executives in the late I 950'sand early 1960's turn out,on average, to be
about four or fiveyears older than their predecessors of theearly
I 940's. The forty-sevenmen who were the highest-paid individuals in
their respective firms in1963 had an averageage of fifty-nine years. In
1940 the comparablefigure for the forty-ninemen who held similar
positions at that timewas only fifty-five years. This pattern holds





Stock Opons Relati','c \!trjlhlt
Ruuk R1 RiR,
I $66,238$19,793 $59,171$17,181 0.8930.868
2 38,23010.64$ 42,28010,894 1. 0)61.023
3 29,299 8,556 22.647 6.159 0.7730,720
4 15,362 4.408 15 .069 4.289 0.981 0.973
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NoTE: Figures in parentheses denote the number of execulives inthe sample at each
position in each year.
positions in 1963 appear to be approximately five yearsolder than their
pre-World War 11 counterparts, and thetypical fifth-ranking executive
fully eight years older.
A careful interpretation of these figuresis called for before the trend
which they signal can be accepted asconclusive, however. By the nature
Year
Executive Rankiog
First Second Ihird Fourth Fifth
1940 56 (49) 53 (48) 54 (44) 53(45) 51 (44)
1941 56 (49) 55 (48) 54 (47) 55(46) 52 (45)
1942 56 (49) 55 (49) 56 (47) 55 (45) 54 (46)
l943 57 (49) 55 (49) 56 (47) 54 (47 55 (45)
1944 58 (50) 58 (50) 56 (48) 55(47) 52(46)
1945 59 (50) 56 (50) 56 (48) 55(46) 54 (45)
1946 59 (50) 57 49) 56 (49) 56 (47) 55 (44)
1947 59 (50) 57 (49) 57 (49) 53 (47) 54 (46)
1948 59 (50) 57 (50) 56 (50) 55(48) 55 (43)
1949 59 (50) 57 (50) 56 (50) 5(48) 56 (43)
1950 60 (50) 58 (50) 56 (49) 57(49) 56 (46)
1951 59 (50) 59 (50) 57 (49) 56 (46) 54 (47)
1952 60 (50) 58 (50) 56 (47) 57 (47) 56 (46)
1953 60 (50) 60 (50) 56 (46) 55(47) 55 (40)
1954 61 (50) 59 (50) 56 (47) 57(45) 56 (41)
1955 62 (50) 59 (50) 58 (46) 56 (43) 56 (38)
1956 61 (50) 61 (48) 59 (46) 56 (42) 55 (31)
1957 61 (50) 60 (48) 57 (45) 57 (40) 55 (29)
1958 61 (50) 58 (49) 59 (40) 56 (38) 56 (29)
1959 61 (50) 58 (48) 59 (38) 56 (32) 55 (29)
1960 60 (50) 59 (46) 57 (33) 57 (32) 55 (24)
1961 59 (49) 60 (44) g (32) 56 (27) 57 (23)
1962 60 (48) 59 (40) 59 (30) 57 (24) 58 (19)
1963 60 (47) 59 (37) 58 (30) 58 (21) 60 (13)216
55L_
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of the process involved in collecting the sample described,the tendency
toward an increasing average age in each executiverank over time will
almost certainly be somewhat overstatedas it stands. The more frequent
gaps in the data in the later years of the study result froman inability
to reconstruct the early compensation experience ofindividuals who did
not become top executives untilvery rcccntiv.Since such individuals
were participants in pension, deferred compensation,and profit-sharing
plans for a number ofyears prior to their appearance in their firm's
proxy statements, they had a substantial historyof benefit promises
which was relevant toan evaluation of their present rewards but was
impossible to compiie-and whicheliminated them from considera-
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tion herc. When eventually they did attain important executive posi-
tions, they were in most CaseS, certainly, younger than their immediate
predecessors. Therefore, the sample depicted above may consist,in
years when it drops signiticantly below a total of fifty men in a particular
rank, of a disproportionate number of older executives. If so, the average
ages calculated for those years will be higher than the true averages for
a full sample of fifty. Because this situation occurs primarily in the
more recent years indicated, an upward bias over time is likely to re-
stilt.
Perhaps the least ambiguous way to handle this bias is simply to ac-
cept as valid only those figures which are generated by a set of observa-
tions sufficiently close to a complete sample that there can he little doubt
as to their accuracy, or at least sufficiently close that some limits can
he placed on the probable extent of their inaccuracy. A rule of thumb
that might he appropriate for this purpose is the following: Let us sup-
pose that the executives missing from the sample in recent years arc live
years younger on average than the ones includedan assumption which
seems a fairly strong one. On that basis, the calculated average age of a
sample of size forty will at most he one full year greater than the "real"
average age of the whole group of fifty it purports to represent.' If then
the figures tabulated for each executive rank are disregarded past the
point where there are no longer forty or more individuals contributing
data thereto. it should be possible to make statements about develop-
nients to that point at least with considerable confidence.T
This problem was discussed previously in Chapter 7.
Thus. if the average age of a group of forty men is x, the average age of a
group of liftvthe last (en of which are aged x5is:
40x4- IOLv - 5)
.5' = - =-v -
50
Problems of thissort should show up onlyin coiinectinn with average
age calculations. There is no reason to suspect thatthe compensation figures
derived above might also he (lstorteLl to any signiticant extent. While the cur-
rent income equivalents of such items as pensions ariddeferred compensation
may he slightly overstated for a sample consistingof a greater percentage of
older indiiduals than the'true' population. salarand bonus levels should be
peculiar to the pu.sdion rathert han the individualFurther, stock options ma
well he used less extensively for eSeclitiVeS nearing retirement ageand. inthe
aggregate, might he slightly understated here, balancingin the total package any
upward biasinthepension and deferred compensationligures.In no case.
hoss ever, should there he ansseriousdistortions.particularly since there are
nottianv YearslUwhich the question arises at alL This contention issupportedI
218 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
The result is a slightlatienuated historical record, hut a set ofCon-
clusions which are hardly less emphatic than those suggested by thera
data. They may be summarized as follows:
('alculated
a The larger figureis the indicated difference trom these tabulations and the
lower one that difference reduced by the one-year "maximum" bias likelyto
result from a sample 01 only forty executives.
This indicates a mean increase of five years if the reported figuresare
accepted and four years if the smaller "adjusted" onesare preferred. It
seems reasonable to believe, therefore, that the top executives inall
five positions in recent years were noticeably older than theirpre-Worid
War II predecessors.
The other characteristic of the data which is noteworthy isthe steady
increase in average executive age within eachyear at successively higher
positions. Up to the point where theaverages begin to become suspect
due to the probable sampling bias discussed, there isa quite consistent
four- to five-year age differential between the fifth-rankingexecutive and
the highest-paid man. Suchan observation, of course, fits the notion of
sonic sort of normal progression by an individual to higher positionsin
his firm with increasingage and experience.
If this phenomenon is predictable, however,the general trend toward
a higher average age in all positions is not. Given thatretirement at 65
has become a morecommon and more formal commitment in recent
by the marked regularity of thepattern of the compensation data among the
five executive positions examined, Ifa bias were present, it should he expected
to manifest itself in a more noticeable fashionthan any of the computations thus
far suggest. In the case of the fifth-rankingexecutive, for example, the indicated
average age rose quite sharply from 1960to 1963 as the size of the sample
simuJtaneously declined. Nowhere in thecompensation time seriesisthere a
counterpart of such a phenomenon. Whenany sudden increases or decreases in
remuneration occur, they invariablyappear inallfive positionsnot injUSt
oneand they are of the same orderof magnitude throughout.
Executivelast Year with Average Age





1 1963 60 56 4
2 1962 59 53 56
3 1958 59 54 4-5
4 1957 57 53
5 1954 56 51 4._5CROSS-SECTiONAL PATTERNS 219
'ears, the expectation might well be that senior executiveswould on
average be younger now than they were prior to World War II. One
conjures up visions of venerable and misanthropic robber barons still
clutching the reins of industrial power in those earlier years but being
steadily replaced over time by a youthful and energetic meritocracy of
professional managers. Nonetheless, the results do not seem to support
that particular view of lifeindeed, they seem to contradict it.
Of the many possible explanations that might be offered, the one
that has the most appeal here because it retains the general outlinesof
the plot suggested is the following: It could be that althoughexecutives
frequently remained in active employment beyond age 65 in days gone
by, they also assumed their respective positions at anearlier stage in
their careers. Suppose that twenty-five years ago the topexecutive in
most firms did not retirc until he was age 68, but thathe likewise became
the top executive when he was only age 50. Understable conditions a
cross section of such individualswould show them to be on average 59
years old. Suppose further thatno'adays every top executive retires at
age 65 but that he usuallydoes not attain that rank until he is fully 61
years old. The average age ofthis sort of a group would therefore be
63 years. In short,ifthe frequency of job changes among senior
corporate executives has increased overtime--more men now being
given a chance at the top positionsthe resultstabulated can be ra-
tionalized despite a trend toward earlier retirement.
Job Tenure
Evidence on job tenure that wouldpermit a test of this hypothesis is
available within the current sample. The averagelength of time the in-
dividuals who are the five highest-paidexecutives in each firm typically
hold their respective positions can becalculated, and any trends over
tinie in that iegard identified. A movetoward significantly shorter terms
of office since the early 1940's wouldbe expected to emerge if the ex-
planation suggested above is valid.
Table 29 presents the results ofsuch an analysis for six different
benchmark years covering the periodstudied. Thus, in 1950, the men
who were the highest-paid executivesin the sample companieshad, on
average, enjoyed that status for5.1 years previously andwould continueEXFCUII\'F ('(IM. IFNSA!'10N
1 A129
Executive Job [entire, bPosition.I 940--6
Ixectitive
Iin[ang I 94()I 945 I 951)I 9551960
/4 i'i'oie \Tjgm/, ot }ears iii Position titter I)tile
Total Nunther of }ears Position Oorupied
to do so for 4.6 more-a total of 10,7years counting 1950 itself.Since
the data do not begin until 1940, ofcourse, there is no record of the
number of years served in the various positionsprior to that time-and,
similarly, no record of tenurepast 1963. The 1945 "before" and the
1960 "after" computationsare likely to be biased to a certain extent for
the same reason.
The total job tenure figures listedat the bottom of the table are the
pertinent ones. As it turnsout, they do display some tendency to de-
crease over time, particularly if the 1945figure is adjusted upward to
A similar analysis was performedon the basis of executive rankings by salary and bonus rather thantotalcompcnsation, The resulis were almost identical
na. 9.7 10.7 9.7 7.3na.
2 na. 6.7 7.2 5.5 5.5na.
3 n.a. 5.5 5.2 5.1 4.0ia.
4 na. 5.2 5.5 5.2 4.4 n.a.
5 n.a. .5.2 5.5 4.6 4.6 n.a.
8.2 5.2 4.6 2.7 1.7
2 4.8 3.5 3(1 1.7 .3
3 3.4 2.6 2.2 1.3 1.0
4 3.3 2.2 1.9 1.6 0.9
5 2.5 2.4 1.6 1.5 1.0
A 'c' e .'\u,nber ole(Ir.s
3.5
n Position Prior to I)u
5.1 6.0 4.6 4.9
2 - 2.2 3.2 2.8 3.2 3.4
3 1.9 2. I 2.8 2.() 3.0
4 2.0 1.6 2.6 2.5 2.5
5 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.6 3.0('ROSS-SECTIONA!. PATTERNS 221
reflect the attenuation of the data prior to 1940. The trend is hardly a
very strong one,however, andiscertain1:not anywhere near the
magnitu(Ie necessary to alone bring about a four-to-five-year change in
average ages. Moreover, theI 961) figure is biased downward, and its
true value would make anover-all trend look exceedingly mild. On
the basis of these results, then, some other explanation must he fourd.
One thing that does stand out in the tabulations is the evidence that
the typical top executive has a significantly lunger terni in office than
any of his four closest subordinates. He holds his job,it seems, ap-
proximately half again as long as does the second-ranking executive and
a little less than twice as long as any of the next three men--all of whom
apparently have about the same tenure. This pattern is followed tlirotigh-
out the period under examination and shows no sign of lessening over
time. The picture that emerges, therefore,is one of fairly rapid job
turnover on the way to the top of the ladder btJt reasonable stability
onceitis attained.
By way of final comment, the fact that average top executive age has
risen during the last quarter century has a further implication when it is
considered in the context of the slow rate of growth of compensation
observed over the same interval:not only have executives not ex-
perienced very substantial increases in pay, but it now seems to take
each individual longer to reach a position where he can actually enjoy
such increases as there are.
Differences in Rankings
The likelihood that the ranking of executives within a particular coni-
pany by the size of their salary and bonus payments may not be the same
as that which results from ordering them according to their fotal com-
pensation has been alluded to earlier. The extent to which a difference
in the two schedules does exist becomes apparent in the course of gen-
erating the cross-sectional comparisons just presented.
A sample consisting of the top five executives in each of fifty com-
panies over a period of twenty-four years will contain at most 6,000
man-years of compensation data. By the nature of theavailable proxy
statement information, 5,300 of those man-years were in fact able tobe222 lx! CVTIVE COMPFNSATION r
compiled lfl(l thus comprise the sample analyzed throughout the
Stti(IV
The question therefore is:Ifl 110W many instances would theindivd1i
occupying one of the 5.300 slots have been in a dilictentPosition
within his firm had the various rankings been COnstrUCted usingdirect
cash payments as the relevant criterion 1rather thanaggregate re-
rnuncration? It turns out that there would have been a total of2,484
such instances, implying that approximately 47 per cent of thetime,
salary and bonus figures are not good indexes of even there/atjs'e
magnitude of an executive's rewards.
A second approach is to consider the number of "company-years"in
which similar discrepancies occur. Out of a possibleI ,200 such data
units in the sample(fifty companies for twenty-four years each)a
different ordering for some or all of the top five executivesresults in
810 cases, if current remuneration instead of total remuneration isused
for the rankings.
There are a number of reasons for these differences. One thatmight
he anticipated is that frequently a senior executive who isnearing re-
tirement is not awarded stock option and incentive plan benefitsto
the same extent that his lower-salaried, and potentiallymore mobile.
colleagues are. When the impact of those arrangements is considered,his
total pay package may well emerge as less valuable thansome of theirs.
Another situation is one in which a long-time top executive iskept
on for several years past normal retirement age in order to lend hisex-
perience and counsel to the new generation. Since hispension benefits
are by then fully determined and completely funded, thereceases to be
any additional current income equivalent for him on that account," and
he is often passed over in the granting ofnew stock options and de-
ferred compensation benefits. Hemay, however, continue to receive his
firm's highest annual salary. Even if he is officiallyreclassified as a
"consultant" and awarded a somewhat smaller annualretainer than his
previous salary, he may still standas one of the top men in the firm if
judged on that basis alone, but not accordingto total compensation.
Differences in rankings can also arise ifone executive has an espe-
The process is discussed in Chapter 7. Thepopulation is that listed in Table
28 and Appendix J.
'' As. of course,was (lone in the presentation of data on the five highest-
salaried executives in each companyover lime.
See the discussion of this pointin Chapter 2.CROSS-SECTIONAL. PATTERNS 223
cia!1favorable experience With his stock options, exercising them at
a time when the market price of the shares involved is substantially
higher than it was when other senior executives took similar action. The
effect ma' be to raise him a notch or two in the total compensation
hierarchy as compared with his position in terms of current remiincra-
tion. While it could be argued that this change is primarily a result of
his investment skillor good fortunerather than an expression of the
intent of the employer company, it is nonetheless a fact. Such executives
do enjoy a higher level of remuneration than their less clever or less
fortunate brethren. The value of a stock option necessarily depends in
large part on the manner in which it is administered by its recipient and
that attribute should be recognizedina scheme of compensation
measurement and ranking.12
A fourth situation is that in which a difference in ages causes the
aggregate remuneration of one executive to exceed that of another
whose salary and bonus arc somewhat greater. Suppose two individuals
differ only slightly in the amount of salary and bonus they receive and
in the size of the annual pension benefits they arc promised, but the
lower-salaried one is older by, say, five years. It is quite possible that,
because the current income equivalent of the latter's pension will he
spread over a shorter interval of time, it will be enough larger than the
one constructed for his colleague to make the total valueof his pay
package greater. While again this may be considered a peculiarity of
the circumstances. it is still true that the older executive, because he is
closer to retirement, does in fact enjoy the larger effective reward.
Finally, of course, there is what might be termed the "normal" case:
A particular individual's total remuneration turns out to be greater than
that of several of his fellow executives having higher salaries and bonuses
12 The possibility that unanticipated variations in stock option profits might
account for certain changes in the rankings has a counterpart in termsof the
collective experience of the men in the sample. The "plateauS' in total remunera-
tion reached in 1955 may well not have been an 1ntenh'd plateau. It couldhe.
for example, that the rewards generated by stock options were unexpectedly
large in 1955 and 1956 (see Charts 6 and 9) due to stock market conditionsand
that, in response, firms reduced the size not only of subsequent option grants but
of other rewards in order to permit the remuneration of their top executives to
average out over lime to levels more like those originallyaimed for. If this were
the case, the historical record in terms of desired compensation might infact
be a steadily rising one duiing the l950's even though the actual pattern cx-
hibits a sudden increase followed by a leveling oft.p
224 EXE('UTIVJCtJ\1 PINSATION
simply because his firm quite intentionally--aud br whateverreason
provides hiiii with more in the way of deferred and coiltingentarrange
ments.
I :These arc the instances which perhaps point LII) fliOStClearl'
the desirability of adopting a comprehensive view of the paypackage
in attempting statements about its size and historical developmento
the other hand, all the indicated possible causes of a differentset of
rankingsarcrelevant and legitimate ones. ihey imply thatevery
dimension ol the pay package is important to an evaluation of its
file----and that this profile would be incorrectly drawn anywherefrom
one-half to two-thirds of the time if salary and bonus alone\\'ere used
for the purpose.
Sununar and Conclusions
Over the last quarter century, the annual salary-plus-bonus differentials
between the top executives of large manufacturing firms andeach of
the men immediately below them in the corporate hierarchy havenar-
rowed. in the case of before-tax current renluneration, this trendhas
occurred only in percentage terms, but after taxes both relativeand
absolute differentials have diminished. Throughout the periodstudied.
the gap between the top executive and the second-rankingone has re-
mained significantly greater than that betweenany of the other four
positions recorded. In fact, the differentials increase steadilyat succes-
sively higher levels of salary and bonus inevery year.
\'hen the value of the entirepay package is considered, a different
history emerges. The total after-tax remuneration associatedwith each
of the five highest-paid executive positions withinthe sample coin-
panics turns out to have grown at approximately thesame rates since
1940. In this more meaningfulsense, therefore, the senior executive
compensation profile has not changed noticeablyover time. Interestingly
enough, that profile displays thesame general characteristic as the
salary and bonus schedule: the higher theexecutive position attained.
the progressively greater the successiveincreases in total remuneration
enjoyed.
The reason the two sets of timeseries differ in their historical implica-
tions is obviously the greater relianceon deferred and contingent corn-
'Actually, the first two situationscited above really belong in this category
as well.pensatiOn devtccs at higher levels of total reward. Since 1955, only
38 per cent of the highest-paid executive's aggregate after-tax reimincra-
tion has been provided by salary and bonus payments. The comparable
figures for the other four top executive positions are 50, 56, 64, and 69
per cent, respecttvely. Each of the major supplements to current re-
muneration follows a similar pattern: The larger an individual's total
compensation, the larger as a per cent of the total are every one of those
supplements.
The conclusion these results suggest is that corporations seem to
have made a deliberate effort to "undo" the differential effect of progres-
sive personal income taxes on executives.1t Indeed, that effort comes
across in the data as not only deliberate but quite successful, since the
persistent salary-and-bonus growth "lag" at the higher-paid executive
positions has been very accurately taken care of by other devices.
A consequence of this phenomenon is the fact that the volatility of
an executive's rewards increases as he attainssuccessively higher posi-
tions within his firm. Stock options and many deferred compensation
and profit-sharing plans utilize shares of the employer corporation's
common stock as all or part of the compensationmedium. The value of
a man's papackage can therefore vary substantially from one year to
the next depending on changes in investors' evaluationsof his firm's
performance. During the period 1955 to 1963, when suchownership-
oriented rewards came into extensive use, annual changes of 16 to32
per centboth positive andnegativein the total remuneration as-
sociated with the same position within a firm were not uncommon, even
when viewed in terms of the "average" occupantof that position. Stock
options in particular accounted for much of this variability.
Information on executives' career experiencesindicates that theare
typically four to five years oliler now than weretheir predecessors of
the early 1940's. It also appears that thehigher the individuals position
in his company, the longer lie occupies itthe topexecutive in each
firm enjoying by far the longest tenure ofthe five considered. In that
connection, the size 01 a man's salary and bonus paymentsturns out to
he a correct index of his standing in hisfirm in terms of aggregate re-
muneration in only about half the casesexamined.
Several of the observed compensation patterns seemsufficiently well-
Or have at least achieved results which aieconcislent with such an objec-
tive.
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defined and reasonable that they may be extrapolated to lowernlanage
ment levels. A tendency toward less emphasis on deferred anti Con-
tingent rewards the smaller the total remuneration to he provitied is
likely to appear throughout the corporation, since the need to side-step
the impact of graduated personal income taxes diminishes according1.
A steady dccrease in the variability of the value of the pay package from
year to year at those lower compensation levels should also follow, al-
though the evidence for senior executives is somewhat ambiguous in
this respect. Finally, a schedule of increasing total and current rernllncra
tion increnients for the individual who climbs to successively higher
management positions in his firm is consistent with the usual view of the
compensation structure within a corporation. The rest of the story for
less visible categories of executives, particularly with regard to the rates
of growth of their remuneration over time, is more difficult to speculate
about from the evidence available here and requires that their experience
be examined directly. The compensation profileat the top of the
corporate hierarchy, however, can now be spoken of with some con-
fidence.